Informal markets by Sharma, Manohar & Zeller, Manfred
R R U U R R A A L L     F F I I N N A A N N C C I I A A L L     P P O O L L I I C C I I E E S S    















program titled Rural 
Financial Policies 
for Food Security of 
the Poor seeks to 
identify policies and 
institutional 
arrangements that 
help the poor 
integrate themselves 
into sustainable 
savings and credit 
systems in order to 
increase capacity to 

















Manohar Sharma is 
a postdoctoral 
fellow of the Food 
Consumption and 
Nutrition Division at 
IFPRI. 
Manfred Zeller is a 
professor at the 
University of 
Goettingen, 
Germany, and a 
former research 
fellow of the Food 
Consumption and 
Nutrition Division at 
IFPRI. 
POLICY BRIEF No 8   •   JULY 2000 
In most developing countries, it is the private, 
informal markets that the rural poor have 
traditionally turned to service their financial 
needs. Why have these institutions succeeded in 
providing services to the poor when formal insti-
tutions have not? Do these informal institutions 
provide any lessons that bigger formal institutions 
could use? What are their basic limitations? An-
swers to such questions indicate important direc-
tions for public policy. 
 Typically, institutions can be categorized as fol-
lows: 
1. Lending and borrowing among rela-
tives, neighbors, and friends. Borrowing from 
socially close lenders is often the first recourse 
that poor households have in financing expenses, 
especially those related to essential consumption 
expenditure. Transactions are collateral-free and 
in most cases interest is not charged. These are 
essentially informal social insurance schemes that 
have the principle of reciprocity at the core of 
transactions. Hence, both the lender and the bor-
rower gain from the transaction, and the process 
is self-sustaining. The borrower is able to finance 
urgently needed expenditures quickly and with 
little transactions costs: there is no lengthy ap-
praisal process involved, little or no paperwork or 
travel time is involved, and the terms of trans-
actions are well understood. The lender gains a 
right to reciprocity that he can lay claim to in the 
future. Further, risk of loan recovery is at a 
minimum since the lender only lends to persons 
who are part of his or her social network, within 
which contracts can be enforced. For each 
partner, therefore, the long-term gains associated 
with maintaining borrowing privilege is greater 
than the short-term gain of reneging on the 
payback. 
2. The rotating credit and saving associ-
ations (ROSCAs) found in many countries are 
also network-based but address different needs of 
its members and the rules of conduct are more 
formalized. These associations, which may even 
operate under a designated manager, pool in sav-
ings from members each period and rotate the 
resulting pot among them using various rules. The 
process is repeated each period until the last 
member receives the pot. Because of the rotating 
rules, these schemes are less suited to address 
household risk unless the timing of the receipt 
coincides with unexpected events. Also, unlike 
demand deposits, once the saving is committed, it 
cannot be drawn immediately and the member is 
required to wait her turn.. The main goal of a 
ROSCA is to mobilize savings and channel this to 
borrowers in some prespecified order, and thus 
fulfill an important intermediation function.  
3. Informal moneylenders. Typically, in-
formal moneylenders are approached when the 
amount of credit required is larger than can be 
obtained from friends and neighbors. Moneylend-
ers charge explicit interest rates in order to obtain 
real positive returns on their capital. In fact, inter-
est rates are usually high and rates in the range of 
5-7 percent per month are not uncommon. 
Typically, moneylenders lend only to households 
about whom they possesses enough information. 
However, they may also lend to others about 
whom they possess less information if punitive 
actions on those that default are feasible. In com-
munities in which they are acceptable, lending 
may be  either explicitly  secured by collateral, or 
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upon a community-wide understanding that 
allows the lender to resort to punitive action when 
contracts are breached. The informal nature of 
these transactions must be noted: these sanctions 
are enforced not by any legal authority but by the 
commonly understood rules of the communities 
themselves. Of course, this may not be feasible in 
all communities.  
4. Tied Credit. Credit transactions are fre-
quently tied with transactions in land and labor 
markets to circumvent problems of inadequate 
information and lack of collateral suitable assets. 
Thus, traders disburse credit to farmers in ex-
change for the right to market the growing crop; 
shopkeepers increase sales by providing credit for 
food, farm inputs, and household necessities; 
large landholders secure access to labor in the 
peak season in return for earlier loan advances to 
laborers. The important feature of these types of 
transactions is that the lender also deals with the 
borrower in a nonlending capacity and is able to 





 A number of important lessons can be learned 
from the informal systems described above. 
1.  Credible long-term partnership. The 
belief that the accumulated benefits associated 
with continued long-term transactions are larger 
than short-term gains associated with delinquent 
behavior is what propels self-enforceability of 
most informal institutions. Formal institutions 
therefore also need to successfully demonstrate to 
clients in small rural communities that they are 
not transitory phenomena and that it is worth-
while for them to invest in a long-term, profitable 
relationship. This demonstration is essential for 
maintaining high repayment rates. Short-term and 
sporadically implemented "credit projects" gener-
ally encounter higher rates of loan delinquency 
precisely because short-run gains associated with 
default outweigh extremely uncertain future 
gains. 
2. Tailoring financial services to specific 
demand patterns. As with the marketing of any 
products, financial services need to be finely 
sculpted to specific demand patterns of the bor-
rowers. For the poor, borrowing privilege in 
various informal institutions is worth preserving 
precisely because their services are very respon-
sive to specific conditions of households. Emer-
gency loans, for example, are obtainable im-
mediately on demand, repayment structure is 
closely linked to local production cycles associ-
ated with the borrower's occupation, and loans are 
renegotiated, taking into account both lender's and 
borrower's specific circumstances. These attri-
butes greatly increase the utility of loans to bor-
rowers and provide further incentive for them to 
retain borrowing privileges. On the contrary, 
when loans terms are incompatible with local pro-
duction patterns or when loans are tied to 
activities that, given the structure of local re-
sources, yield poor returns, very little is gained by 
retaining borrowing privileges. Benefits from de-
faulting in such cases may outweigh retaining 
borrowing privileges. 
3. Knowledge of local economy is im-
portant; therefore, so is decentralization of 
decision-making. The ways in which financial 
transactions are interlinked with transactions in 
the market for land, produce, and labor by in-
formal agents indicate the potential for making 
such types of innovations in the formal sector. 
This requires intimate knowledge of the structure 
of local economy as well as of local institutional 
arrangements that may be used to strengthen fi-
nancial links between the borrower and the 
lender. Generally this is not possible within a top-
down organizational framework; what is needed 
is the active involvement of front-line managers 
who can design financial products that take full 
account of local institutions and local resource 
endowments. 
4. Not all financial contracts are self-en-
forcing and adequate steps must be taken to 
enforce contract compliance. The majority of 
informal financial contracts between friends and 
relatives are of a self-enforcing nature, but social-
ly distant lenders depend a lot on external, though 
not necessarily legally codified, mechanisms to 
enforce repayments. Just as moneylenders win the 
mandate of small communities to take punitive 
actions against defaulters, it is also important for 
formal institutions to have clear and imple-
mentable plans for contract enforcement and loan 
recovery before lending begins. Lack of a credible 
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